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SUMMARIES 
Bertrand Russell's paradox of the class of all 
classes which do not belong to themselves is among 
the best-known results in the history of the 
foundations of mathematics, but the historical 
circumstances of its discovery are not very well- 
known. This paper contains a possible re-construct- 
ion of Russell's line of thought, followed by 
hitherto unpublished manuscript evidence to support 
the conjecture. 
Le paradoxe de la classe de toute les classes 
n'appartenant pas h elles-m&me est parmi les 
r&.&tats les mieux connus de l'histoire des 
fondements des mathr?matiques. N&anmoins, les 
circonstances entourant sa dgcouverte ne sont pas 
t&s bien connues. Dans le pr&ent article, nous 
proposons une reconstitution possible du cheminement 
de la pen&e de Russell, qui sera suivie d'indications, 
issues de manuscrits non encore publies, etayant 
notre conjecture. 
1. CANTOR'S DIAGONAL ARGUMENT 
The first meeting of the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung 
was held in September 1891 at Halle/Saale where Georg Cantor 
was professor of mathematics at the university. He had been 
instrumental in the founding of the association, and was elected 
its first chairman. As his contribution to the proceedings he 
spoke 'On an elementary question of set theory' [1892] in which 
he presented his diagonal argument to prove the non-denumerability 
of the linear continuum [l]. 
Cantor presented his argument in the following form. Take 
a pair of distinct characters m and w, and consider the set M 
of denumerable ordered sequences E of m and w: u 
(1) Eu = (au, 1, au, 2, . . . a , v, . . .I, u = 1, 2, . . ., 1-I 
where 
(2) a u' v = n or w. 
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Define 
(3) EO = (bl, b2, . . . b , . . .) V 
by the property that 
(4) if a v, v = m or w, then bv = w or m respectively. 
Then 
(5) EO # E !J 
for all n. But EO is of the form of (l), and so belongs to M. 
Hence M is a non-denumerable set. 
Cantor did not associate M with the linear continuum, but 
this can easily be done by taking m = 0 and w = 1, interpreting 
Eu as the binary expansion of a real number (within [O,l] say), . 
and introducing a convention to identify the forms . . . ..Olll..... 
with . . . . . 1000 . . . . . . In terms of his later work, the theorem 
thus proved is usually stated as 
(6) 2*0 do, 
and is often called his 'power-class theorem'. 
Cantor concluded his paper with another example of the 
theorem. M was now the set of characteristic functions f(x) 
of subsets of [O,l]. If M has the cardinality of [O,l], then 
there is a one-one correspondence +(x, z) between the functions 
f and the numbers z belonging to [O,l]. Now define the function 
g as follows: 
(7) if 4(x, x) = 0 or 1, then g(x) = 1 or 0 respectively. 
g(x) is characteristic over a subset of [O,l], and so belongs 
to M. But by definition in (7) g has no correspondent under 4. 
Hence M in fact has a greater cardinality than that of [O,l]. 
This paper [1892] contained Cantor's second proof of the 
non-denumerability of the continuum, In [1874] he had 
constructed a different proof by taking a nesting sequence of 
closed intervals and claiming (via an implicit appeal to his 
earlier definition of irrational numbers) the existence of a 
limiting number contained within all these intervals. As Cantor 
mentioned in [1892], his new proof was both simpler in form and 
more general in application, and gradually it superseded its 
predecessor in mathematicians' presentations of set theory [2]. 
In particular, Russell discussed it in his The Principles of 
Mathematics [1903]. 
2. RUSSELL'S USE OF CANTOR'S DIAGONAL ARGUMENT 
Although Cantorian set theory was in active development among 
Continental mathematicians in the 189Os, it was little studied 
in the United Kingdom. Thus Russell came across it only when he 
diagonal argument he discovered his paradox. 
Cantor was the first mathematician to discover paradoxes in 
set theory. Around the time of Russell's discovery of his work 
he found the paradoxes of the greatest ordinal and the greatest 
cardinal. He did not publish them at the time, but they 
gradually became circulated in mathematical correspondence (see 
especially my [1971, 116, 1191). Russell discovered the cardinal 
paradox for himself early in 1901, and sometime in the next 
six months found his own [4]. 
Cantor's paradox can be formulated in terms of the 
cardinality of the class of all classes- 'Cls‘ in Russell's 
notation. In a paper of 1902 by Whitehead (who worked closely 
with Russell) paradoxes are close to the surface, for there 
Whitehead stated that Cls is itself a class, and thus the 
distinction between membership and inclusion does not apply to 
it ([Whitehead 1902, 3721; compare [Jourdain 1906, 134-1351). 
Instead we have 
Cls E Cls. Cls = Cls. 
A passage in The Principles [Russell 1903, 366-3671 makes fairly 
explicit the connection between the diagonal argument and classes 
of the size of Cls: 
"Another form of the same [diagonal] argument is 
the following. Take any relation R which has the two 
properties (1) that its domain, which we will call p, 
is equal to its converse domain, (2) that no two terms 
of the domain have exactly the same set of relate. 
Then by means of R, any term of p is correlated with 
a class contained in p, namely the class of relata 
to which the said term is referent; and this correlation 
is one-one. We have to show that at least one class 
contained in p is omitted in this correlation. The 
class omitted is the class w which consists of all 
terms of the domain which do not have the relation R 
to themselves, i.e. the class w which is the domain 
of the logical product of R and diversity. For, if 
y be any term of the domain, and therefore of the 
converse domain, y belongs to w if it does not belong 
to the class correlated with y, and does not belong 
to w in the contrary case. Hence w is not the same 
class as the correlate of y; and this applies to 
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whatever term y we select. Hence the class w is 
necessarily omitted in the correlation. . . . 
It is instructive to examine in detail the 
application of Cantor’s argument to such cases by 
means of an actual attempted correlation. In the 
case of terms and classes, for example, if x be not 
a class, let us correlate it with IX, i.e. the 
class whose only member is x, but if x be a class, 
let us correlate it with itself. (This is not a 
one-one, but a many-one correlation, for x and lx 
are both correlated with lx; but it will serve to 
illustrate the point in question.) Then the class 
which, according to Cantor’s argument, should be 
omitted from the correlation, is the class w of 
those classes which are not members of themselves; 
yet this, being a class, should be correlated with 
itself. But w. . . is a self-contradictory class, which 
both is and is not a member of itself.” [S] 
The form of Cantor’s argument used here by Russell resembles 
that in the second part of Cantor’s [1892]. Russell takes the 
universal class V, sets up a correspondence f between V and its 
power-class in which every individual maps into its unit class 
and every class into itself, and then considers the class B of 
classes which do not belong to the classes corresponding under 
f. In Cantor’s proof it would follow that f3 had no correspondent 
in V; in this case, B becomes the class w of all classes which 
do not belong to themselves, and the conclusion is drawn that 
(9) WEW.E. w$w 
--which is Russell’s paradox. Russell could have simplified his 
reasoning by working only with Cls instead of V and setting up 
f as the (one-one) identity correspondence between Cls and its 
power-class. However, p erhaps in search of maximum generality, 
he seems to have thought out the argument in terms of V, and SO 
perforce required a more complicated specification of f. 
Forms of this reconstruction have been suggested before by 
Crossley 119731 and by Bunn 11978, 2391. My purpose now is to 
present some documentary evidence to support it. 
3. AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN RUSSELL AND HARDY 
In his early years Russell was not a systematic keeper of 
his manuscripts or correspondence, and the original sheets on 
which he discovered his paradox have not survived [6]. The most 
detailed account of which I know is in an exchange of letters 
with G. H. Hardy. It is largely forgotten now that Cantorian 
set theory was one of Hardy’s early mathematical interests, 
but he and Russell discussed such questions in the 1900s both 
in correspondence and in conversation together at Trinity College, 
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Cambridge where they were both Fellows [Hardy 1903; 19061. 
Hardy kept no papers, but he would often send letters back to 
their writers together with his own replies. Thus there are 
some extensive letters to Hardy from Russell in Russell's 
manuscripts. 
We are concerned here with the first two of a string of 
questions which Hardy sent to Russell on 30 June 1905, and 
Russell's replies of 2 July. In the rendition below I have 
silently expanded contracted words but enclosed any other 
editorial interpolations within square brackets. To avoid 
confusion I have converted three pairs of square brackets set 
down by Russell into round brackets, and to lend clarity to the 
text I have displayed symbolic lines which were run iJ1 with the 
original text. The footnotes are all mine. 
Hardy began with a question about the multiplicative axiom. 
This was a form of an axiom of choice discovered by Russell in 
1904, and was so called because it arose in the context of the 
definition of the multiplication of an infinity of cardinals. 
Russell's discovery was independent of Zermelo's publication 
later that year in [1904] of such an axiom in the course of 
proving Cantor's well-ordering theorem (see my [1972]; and [1977, 
46-47, 80, 1711). Zermelo was quite certain about the need for 
this axiom; but Russell was doubtful about various aspects of 
it, especially, as Hardy mentioned in his opening question to 
Russell, the difficulty of defining such an essentially 
extensional axiom in terms of an in-tensional propositional 
function: 
"(i) Is definition by extension logically 
restricted to finite classes [?] In 'Pr. of Math.' 
(571) [1903, 691 you seem to say, No. Do you adhere 
to this, and if so doesn't it affect the root of 
the multiplicative class difficulty [?I" 
Russell replied: 
"( 1) Definition by extension. Logically, 
there is no such thing. The class whose members are 
a and b is defined by the intension "identical with 
a or identical with b"; and what one commonly calls 
definition by extension is really definition by 
intensions of this type; i.e. 
~(a u l'b = G {x = a. V. x = b} Df. [7] 
To eXteJld this beyond a finite number, we need the 
notion V‘k, where 
V‘k. = : (~P).PE~.P 
(i.e. "some member of k is true"); and the class k 
will be composed of propositions, each of which is 
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of the form x = a. But the values that a may take 
must be given by an intension, say +*a. Thus 
p E kx. = : (3 a) : $‘a : p. = .x = a. 
Thence after some time we find that the intended 
definition by extension becomes 
i {(ZJa). $‘a. x = al 
which is only a more complicated form of the pure 
intensional definition 
The above is more anti-extensional than I was in my 
book." 
Hardy's second question continued the theme of extensionality 
"2 . Is Cantor's proof of 2 ao > 00 open to the 
same objection [?] [8]. His 'diagonal class' is 
defined by c = 1 if c 
n n’ n 
=O,=Oifc =l. 
n’ n 
Isn't this perfectly definite i.e. without 'freedom 
of choice'? If so how does denying the multiplicative 
class solve the difficulty of the greatest cardinal?" 
Russell's reply reads as follows: 
"(2) Cantor's proof of 
a E NC. > * 2a > a 
was what started me on my contradiction; for it was 
obvious beforehand that it couldn't apply if 
a = Nc(v, where 
V = x(x = x) = everything. 
In the case of 2 aO > ao, the form of proof which he 
generalised does not hold; but I think the earlier 
proof, using the properties of n and 6, is sound [9]. 
Observe the following: compare v and Cls. We have 
1 sim V. 1CCls [lo]. 
(1 sim V comes from the fact that the relation of 
x to l&x is one-one.) Thus by Schrbder-Bernstein 
[ll], V sim Cls. But Cls = Cls<V, so that 
Nc'v 
NcCv=2 . 
Now apply the method of the SchrEder-Bernstein proof 
to establishing an actual one-one [correspondence] 
between v and Cls. There is no difficulty in this [12]. 
Then apply the method of Cantor's proof of 2a > a 
to construct the supposed omitted class. (Generally, 
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if R is one-one and correlates all members of u 
with some of Cls‘u, the omitted class, by Cantor's 
method, is 
where -)'fRcx means the class correlated with x 
by the relation R.) You will find the intension 
by which the supposed class is defined contains 
x % E x as a factor. Similar illegitimate 
intensions (i.e. intensions which don't define 
classes) may be got by the same method from Rel 
and Cls'Rel, 2 and Cls'2, or any u and Cls'u 
where NC% = NC%. This is a method of discovering 
what sort of intensions go wrong." 
The rest of this reply discusses the multiplicative axiom. 
We see here the passage quoted earlier from The Principles 
developed in more detail, especially concerning the relationship 
between Cls and v. We also notice some unexplained reservations 
about the generalisability of the diagonal argument, in contrast 
with the confident opinions expressed in The Principles, where 
it is the first proof that is criticised [1903, 362-3661. 
4. RUSSELL'S LATER VIEWS ON CANTOR'S DIAGONAL ARGUMENT 
Russell proposed in The Principles a theory of types to solve 
the paradoxes, but he also showed there its formal inadequacy 
[1903, esp. ch. 10 and appendix B]. In the immediately following 
years he attempted a variety of solutions, not all of which had 
a type-theoretic structure. One of these is of especial 
interest to us. He accepted Cantor's power-class theorem as 
legitimate--for example, later in the letter to Hardy he said 
that "the general proposition 
u E Cls. 1. NccClsCu = 2Nc‘u 
holds, I think, without limitation" [13]--and was so impressed 
by the similarity between the diagonal-argument proof and the 
means of generating his paradox that he tried to use 2" > a as 
a criterion for founding some kind of set theory. He wrote to 
Jourdain in May 1905: 
"A class very like x 3 (x s E x) does in fact 
occur in the proof of 2o > CL. For the nerve of 
the proof is: 
R E 1 -f 1. D‘R = U, EcR C Cls%. 
w = G{x E u. ,-lJ (x E -I Yx, I. > . w s E D'R. 
Here $'x means the class of relata of x, .)%'x 
means the only member of this class (since 
R E 1 -+ I), and this only member is itself a class, 
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since Z‘RC Cls"u. Here also 
you see that the definition of w is much likeu 
x(x s E x); and if w is not a proper class, 2 > c1 
may not be true" [14]. 
However, like all predecessors to Zermelo's 1908 axiom system 
for set theory, Russell failed to realise the extent to which 
axiomatisation has to be taken. Zermelo has a power-class axiom, 
but it is only one axiom among several [lS]. Further, unlike 
Zermelo, Jourdain and Cantor, Russell was not convinced that the 
paradoxes arose out of assuming the existence of "too big" 
classes. He felt his own paradox to be the most fundamental 
(since it used no arithmetical concepts at all), and did not 
regard its defining class as "too big" in the Cantorian sense 
of being incapable of enlargement, In a graphic phrase to 
Jourdain he described the class (and its defining propositional 
function) as "only half way up" (my [1977, 35]), since only 
half of all possible properties would determine classes which 
did not belong to themselves. For him the root of the difficulty 
lay in admitting excessively complicated defining properties. 
Eventually he was to hold in 1906 that the vicious circle 
principle was the criterion for avoiding paradoxes, and to see 
the type theory of Principia Mathematics as erected upon it. 
But that is another, and much better-known, story. 
NOTES 
A diagonal-type argument was used by du Bois Reymond in 
[187ij; Cantor never referred to it, though it appeared in a 
well-known journal. 
2. I shall not discuss in detail the diffusion of the 
diagonal argument in the mathematical community, but I consider 
three well-known early books. L. Couturat gave only the first 
proof in his [1896, 6241; Cantor's [1892] is not even in the 
bibliography. E. Bore1 gave both in his [1898], though the 
first was given in the text (p. 15) and the second in a note 
at the end (pp. 107-109). A. Schonflies presented them 
together in his report to the Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung 
[1900, 201. 
3. Russell made many notes on Cantor's and on others' work 
in a large black notebook, now kept with his papers in the 
Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 
Canada, Copyright (1978) of all Russell's published and 
unpublished writings presented in this paper is held at 
McMaster University by Res.-Lib, Ltd. 
4. Russell is very vague on the date of his discovery. He 
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gave June 1901 in his [1944, 131 and in [1956, 261, but he gave 
the spring in [1959, 75-761 and May in [1967, 1471. Perhaps 
better (qua earlier) evidence in Jourdain [1913, 1461 is that 
Russell found Cantor's paradox in January and his own in June. 
But Russell was inconsistent about the date in other letters to 
Jourdain: he gave June in April 1910, but the spring in 
September 1917 (see my [1977, 133, 1441). The penultimate 
draft of The Principles seems to have been completed in May 1901 
and contains nothing on the paradox [Blackwell unpublished], so 
that June appears to be the most likely date. 
Compare (p. 527), his letter of 24 June 1902 to Frege irk 
[Freie 1976, 2161 and his [1919 1361. 
6. There is a manucript in'the Russell Archives called 
'Lecture II. Logic of propositions', possibly relating to a 
lecture course on mathematical logic that he gave in the winter 
of 1901-1902 at Trinity College, Cambridge. The first two 
folios certainly deal with this theme, but the later folios 
formulate the paradox in its class and relation forms, and also 
mention Cantor's diagonal argument at one point. Although 
these sheets may not relate to the lecture and be not of that 
period, they give the impression of pretty early work. 
7. 'x' is Russell's current notation, taken from Frege, for 
class abstraction. 
8. 'a()' is Russell's notation for Cantor'sHO; 'I can't 
make Alephs', he confessed once to Jourdain (see my [1977, 261). 
9. This is a reference to Cantor's first proof (footnote 
2) 3 in which is assumed a definition of the continuum (P) from 
the rationals (n) via a definition of irrational numbers. 
10. Note that in Russell's notation 'c' denotes improper 
inclusion. Note also that 
1 = ; {(3x). CY. = ,'x) Df. 
11. The SchrGder-Bernstein theorem is essential for the 
comparison of the cardinalities of sets. In its early forms it 
states that if two sets a and 8 are such that each one is of 
equal cardinality to a subset of the other, then they are of 
equal cardinality to each other. Cantor states the theorem 
without proof in his [1896, art. 2, thm. B] (= [1932, 2851). 
Schrsder's proof was given in [1898] and criticised in [Korselt 
19111. Bernstein's proof appeared in [Bore1 1898, 104-1071. 
Dedekind produced a proof in [1887], but for some reason he 
never published it; see also his 1899 proof [Cantor 1932, 4491. 
12. In his proof Bernstein sets up the postulated one-one 
correspondence between a and the subset y of B and considers 
the subset of y which is isomorphic to a subset of a under the 
other postulated one-one correspondence. Presumably Russell 
had this procedure in mind. 
13. The only reservation about the theorem which I know 
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Russell to have expressed manifests itself in a letter to him 
of 7 January 1906 by E. V. Huntington (kept in the Russell 
Archives). The location of Russell's letter to Huntington is 
unknown. 
14. See my [1977, SZ] incorporating a correction of Russell's 
,-t, R to Q, E. D(R and DCR are respectively the domain and range 
of R. 'Proper class' here means a legitimate, paradox-free, 
class. 
15. See Zermelo [1908, axiom IV]. Zermelo discovered 
Russell's paradox for himself in 1899, two years before Russell 
(see Hilbert's letter to Frege in Frege [1976, 801). Zermelo's 
Nachlass, kept in the Handschriftenabteilung of the 
lJniversit%tsbibliothek at Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany, 
appears to contain no relevant manuscripts. However, someone has 
just (1978) found relevant information in the Husserl Archives; 
hopefully it will be included in a future paper in HM. 
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